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status,  or sexual orientation.The  idea  that  steady-state  growth  rates  may  not  converge  over  the
long  run  has  been  the  driving  impetus  in the  proliferating  literature
on  endogenous  growth,  and  especially  that  segment  of  this  literature
that  focuses  on  the  role  of  human  capital  (Lucas,  1988  and  Romer,
1990).  Human  capital,  however,  is  an  amorphous  concept  and  little  has
been  said  about  its features  and  the  mechanism  by  which  it  contributes
to production  and  thus  growth.  In  this  paper  we  focus  on
specialization as  a  crucial  (and  somewhat  neglected)  aspect  of  human
capital  accumulation,  and  study  its  impact  on  growth.  Our  effort
differs  from  Yang  and  Borland's  (1991)  model  in  which  the  division  of
labor  evolves  via  learning  by  doing  and  increasing  returns  to  scale.
In  their  work,  division  of  labor  is  taken  to  mean  different  workers
producing  different  goods.  Consequently,  worker  productivity  increases
with  the  level  of  output  as  workers  produce  more  of  the  same  good.  In
our  paper,  productivity  increases  with  specialization  directly,  rather
than  indirectly  via  the  types  of  goods  produced.  The  model  indicates
that  economic  growth  is  possible  even  with  no  technological  change  or
learning  by  doing,  but  through  increased  specialization.
Our  view  of  specialization  is  one  based  Kim's  (1989),  distinction
between  intensive  human  capital  and  extensive  human  capital.  The
former  is  a  stock  of  specialized  knowledge  and  skills  that  improves
worker  productivity  in  a  given  production  activity;  the  latter  is  a
stock  of  general  knowledge  that  renders  the  workers  more  adaptable  to  a
variety  of  activities.  The  key  point  is  the  existence  of  trade-off
between  two  types  of  human  capital.  Loosely  speaking,  although  a
specialist  will  be  more  productive  (thus  command  higher  wages)  than  a
generalist  in  a  limited  range  of  tasks  that  require  specialist's  skill,the  chance  of  such  a  good-matching  job  may  be  smaller  for  the
specialist.  Naturally,  increased  specialization  means  more  of  the
intensive  and  less  of  the  extensive  human  capital.
We  assume  that  production,  consumption,  and  labor  market  clearing
takes  no  time  whereas  investment  in  human  capital  is  both  costly  and
time-consuming.  As  a  result,  our  analysis  consists  of  two  parts;  in
the  first  part the  firms  and  the  labor  market  operate,  assuming  that
households  are  endowed  with  a  given  level  of  human  capital  (see  Kim
1989  for further  detail).  The  contemporaneous  link  between  human
capital,  specialization,  and  output  is  derived  in  this  section.  In  the
second  part  households  maximize  a  utility  function  subject  to  an
intertemporal choice  between  investment  on  intensive  and  extensive
human  capital,  versus present  consumption.  This  part  therefore
resembles  the  usual  household  dynamic  maximization  problem  of  choosing
between  consumption  and  investment  in  physical  capital,  but  focuses  on
investment  in  human  capital  instead.
While  the  model  is  one  of  endogenous  growth  variety  we  abstract
from  the  external  spillover  effects  of  human  capital  and  yet  are  still
able  to  generate  non-convergence  of  growth  rates  in  the  long  run.
These  turn  out  to  depend  on  the  "educational  technology"  that  underlies
the  cost  of  acquiring  intensive  and  extensive  human  capital,  and  on  the
growth  of  population.  It  is  easy  to extent  this  model  to  incorporate
external  spillover  effects  of  specialization  as  well.
I.  Contemporaneous  Labor  Market  Equilibrium
Consider  a  closed  economy  with  a  continuum  of  workers-cum-
2consumers  of  aggregate  size  N(t)  at  given  time  t.  Labor  is  assumed  the
only  factor,  producing  a  homogeneous  output  that  is  sold  in  a
competitive  market.  The  output  price  is  normalized  to  one.  Workers
are  indexed,  by  skill  characteristic,  on  the  circumference  of  a  circle
of  unit  length  with  uniform  density.  Because  the  circle  has  unit
length,  the  density  is  also  N(t).  Although  workers  are  allowed  to
choose  their  optimal  accumulation  of  intensive  and  extensive  human
capital,  b(t)  and  G(t),  over  time,  their  skill  characteristics  are
assumed  to  be  exogenously  given.  Dealing  with  a  contemporaneous
economy  in this  section,  we  shall  drop  the  time  subscript  for  now.
There  are  multiple  of  production  technologies  available  to  produce
the  homogeneous  output.  Each  firm  adopts  a  particular  technology  with
specific  skill  requirements.  If  the  worker's  skill  characteristic
differs  from  the  firm's  job  requirement,  costly  training  of  the  worker
is  needed  for  what  the  job  requires.  As  the  job  requirement  represents
the  skill  characteristic  of  the  worker  who  does  not  require  any
on-the-job-training,  firms  also  can  be  indexed  on  the  same  unit  circle
as  workers.  Thus,  the  productivity  of  a  worker  in  a  given  firm  depends
on  his  skill  characteristic,  his  intensive  and  extensive  human  capital,
and  the  firm's  job  requirement.  In particular,  we  shall  assume  that:
(1)  x(s)  =  b  - s/G,  0  <  s  <  .5
where  x  is  the  worker's  productivity  (labor  input  in  efficiency  units)
and  s  is  the  difference  between  the  worker's  skill  characteristic  and
the firm's  job requirement.
All  technologies  are  assumed  to  require  an  identical  minimumefficient  scale  (M).  Thus,  a  representative  firm's  production  function
can  be  written  as:
(2)  Y  =  ,  if  X  <  M  where,  X  =  (b  - s/G)  ds.
SX-  M  if  X > M,  seS
Y  is  output,  X  is  the  total  labor  input  normalized  to  the  equivalent
labor  unit  with  the  firm's  job  requirement,  and  S  is  the  set  of  workers
who  work  for  the  firm.
The  firm  will  hire  a  worker  if  his  marginal  value  product  with the
firm  exceeds  the  firm's  training  cost.  The  profit  of  the
representative  firm  is:
H  H
(3)  I  (H)  =  2N  J  (b  - s/G) ds  - M  - 2N  S  w(s)  ds
0  0
where  H  is  the  maximum  acceptable  skilldifference  of  the  representative
firm.  We  limit  our  analysis  to the  zero profit  symmetric  bargaining
equilibrium.  By  symmetry  we  mean  that:  1)  All  workers  have  the  same
(b,  G);  2)  The  wage  functions  are  identical  for  all  firms;  and  3)  Firms
are  equally  spaced  on  the  circle.  Hence,  the  number  of  firms  in  the
market  (n)  is  equal  to  1/2H,  since  the  job  requirement  difference
between  any  two  neighboring  firms  is  2H.
The  wage  is  assumed  to  be  determined  according  to  an  axiomatic
bargaining  solution  between  the  worker  and  the  firm.  More
specifically,  each  person  engaged  in  the  bargaining  knows  exactly  what
his  gain  will  be  from  having  the  employment  contract,  and  the
bargaining  outcome  (i.e.,  wage)  will  occur  at the  mid-point,  where  the
4worker's  surplus  of  having  the  employment  contract  over  his  second  best
alternative  (threat point)  equals  the  firm's  marginal  profit  from
having  the  worker.  We  assume  that  the  worker's  threat  point  is  the
highest  possible  wage  in  the  negotiation  with  the  other  firm.
To  determine  the  wage  function  w(s),  consider  a  worker  whose  skill
characteristic  differs  from  the  job  requirement  of  the  representative
firm  by  s  and  therefore  from  the  job  requirement  of  the  neighboring
firm  by  2H  - s.  Given  this  wage  determination  rule,  the  equilibrium
wage  function  of  the  competition  case  will  be  independent of  s:
(b  - s/G)  +  (b  - (2H-s)/G)  b  - HG
(4)  w(s)  =  2=  b  - H/G, 2
In  equilibrium,  all  firms  earn  zero  profits,  and  the  zero  profit
condition  determines  the  equilibrium  number  of  firms  given  the
characteristic  of  the  labor  pool  (b,  G).  Substituting  the  wage
function  into the  profit  function  and  equating  it  to  zero,  we  obtain:
(5)  H=  (GM/N)
1/ 2
(6)  n  =  1/2H  =  (1/2)  (N/GM)
1/ 2
(7)  w= b  - (M/GN)
1 2 .
II.  Dynamic  Equilibrium
Given  the  characteristics  of  the  labor  pool  (b(t),G(t))  at  any
time  t,  the  wage  bargaining  rule  and  the  zero  profit  condition
determine  the  labor  market  equilibrium,  summarized  by  w(s,t),  and  H(t).
Here,  the  worker-consumer  is  assumed  to  decide  on  the  time path of  the
5stock  of  intensive  and  extensive  human  capital,  (b(t),G(t)),  knowing
that  w(s,t),  and  H(t)  will  prevail.  Although  H  is  a  function  of
(b(t),G(t))  in  the  aggregate,  each  worker  views  H  as  fixed.  (In  the
case  of  the  central  planner  problem,  H  will  be  allowed  to vary).
Further,  since  the  equilibrium  wage  is  independent  of  s,  s  will  be
deleted  from  consideration.  Assuming  a  discount  rate  of  p,  the
worker's  maximization  problem  is:
(8)  Maximize  X  u(c(t))e  dt  subject  to
bt ,  Gt  0
(9)  c  =  b  - H/G  - g(b,G),
where,  g(b,G)  is  the  cost  of  the  incremental accumulation of  intensive
and  extensive  human  capital.  To  simplify  the  analysis  we  assume  that
the  cost  function  is  separable in  b  and  G.  Using  the  utility  function,
u  =  [c  -- 1]/(1-c),  calculus  of  variations  yields:
(10)  1  - pg  - r(c/c)g  +  g  b  =  0.
b  b  bb 2
(11)  H/G 2  - pg  - r(c/c)g  +  g  G  =  0
G  G  GG
These  equations  describe  the  dynamics  of  the  system.  Let  the  separable
cost  function  be  g(b,G)  =  mb'+  nGV  (m,n,P,y  > 0).  Further,  g  must  be
convex  in  b  (3  >  1),  to  rule  out  investing  all  of  one's  income  on  b
(given the  linearity  of  wage  in  b)  and  thus  zero  consumption  (note that
INote  that  equilibrium  implies  nY  =  N[c  +  g(b,G)].  Given  the  budget
constraint,  above,  it  is  easy  to  show  that  this  condition  is  satisfied.
6u'(0)  =  o).  However,  convexity  of  g  in  both  variables  need  not  hold  to
ensure  optimality  (concavity  of  u  suffices).  Using  this  cost  function,
and  eliminating  c/c  between  (10)  and  (11),  we  find:
1  1-3  b  - H  1-  G
(12)  ••  +  (-1)  =  G  +  (7-1) (3m  nG2  G
Denote  the  steady-state  growth  of  the  two  types  of  human  capital
by  b/b a  e  and  G/G  m 4;  not  necessarily  equal.  We  shall  determine  9
and  4,  below.  Using  the  fact  that  b/b  =  b/b  and  G/G  =  G/G  in
1/2
steady-state  and  substituting  for  H  =  (GM/N)  ,  equation  (12)  becomes:
1/2 (  e1  -b(t))  +  (1-i)e  M  1  -(1/2+7)  -1/2
(13)  m(eb(t))1  +  -)  - lG(t)  /  N(tl)  +  (n-1)
3m  yn
This  equation  is  valid  for  all  t.  Suppose  that  the  population  grows  at
an  exogenously  given  constant  rate,  N/N  =  v  >  0.  Differentiating  (13)
first to  eliminate  the  constant  terms,  then  using  b  =  eb,  G  =  4G,  and  N
=  vN,  and  finally  log-differentiation  of  the  result  gives:
(14)  (3-1)9  =  v/2  +  (1/2+y7)
Equation  (14)  is  one  key  equation  of  the  model,  relating  steady-state
growth  rates  of  b,  G  and  N.  It  turns  out,  however,  that  while  b,  G  and
N  can  grow  at  steady  state  rate  at all  t,  the  per  capita  rate of  growth
of  consumption,  A  s  c/c,  involves  transitional  dynamics  for finite  t,
approaching  a  steady-state  rate  of  growth  only  as  t  - co.  To  see  this,
7first  note  that  manipulating  (10)  gives:
(15)  X=  1  I_ _(eb)  1- 3   -(/-1)et  -le-p (1 5)  A  - (b )1  e 'oQ  + ( -1) 9 - p
Similarly,  from  (11)  one  gets:
16)  =  (  M 1 2  1-y  -1/2-  (/2  -1[(1/2+7)C+V/2It
(16)  A  -=  -(0  G  N   )e  +  ('-)  - p Or  yn  o  o
where  (.)  's  represent  initial  values.  Each  of  the  equations  (15)  and
o
(16)  consists  of  a  time-dependent  and  a  time-independent  component  for
A.  Since  both  equations  describe  the  same  A,  the  long-run  steady  state
component  of  A must  be  identical  in  both,  i.e.:
(17)  (7-1)0  =  (13-1)e  >  0
Solving  (14)  and  (17)  together  for  8  and  0  we  get:
(18)  s  =  - v/3
(19)  e  =  1-7
Thus,  extensive  human  capital  declines over  time.  From  this,  we  see
that  positive  long-run  growth  implies  X  <  1 (eq.  16).  By  substituting  <
=  -v/3  into  the  time-dependent  exponent  of  (15)  the  condition  Y  <  1
turns  out  to  be  sufficient  for  the  transitional  component  of  A  to
vanish  in  the  long  run.  Further,  13  >  1  means  that  8  >  0  (eq.  19).
8This  confirms  the  positive  long  run  growth,  now  via  equation  (15).  In
short,  the  economy  experiences  positive  sustained  long-  run  growth,
intensive  human  capital  rises  steadily  and  extensive  human  capital
falls  steadily,  i.e.,  workers  become  more  specialized  over  time.
The  above  range  of  parameters  also  implies  that  A approaches
steady-state  from  above  since  from  equations  (15)  or  (16)  we  find  that
aX/at  <  0.  In  order  to  find  the  asymptotic  features  of  A,  substitute
from  (18)  into  the  long-run  steady-state  component  of  A in  (16):
(20)  AIt_  =  (-v  - p)/o t-mo  3
As  expected,  the  asymptotic  value  of  A falls with  7,  oa and  p.  To
understand  why  asymptotic  growth  Increases with  population  growth,
first  note,  from  the  static  analysis,  that  increasing  N  increases  firm
profits  and  thus  the  number  of  firms,  n.  With  more  firms  the  value  of
H  (i.e.  the  "skills-market"  segment  per firm)  will  drop,  as  there  will
be  more  diverse  job  requirements  available.  From  the  dynamic  analysis
we  see  this  drop  by  log-differentiating  equation  (5):
(21)  h  =  H/H  =-  v  <  0 2  3
Loosely  speaking,  this  raises  the  chance  of  good  matching  jobs,
lowering  the  importance  of  G  relative  to  b.  From  equations  (18)  and
(19)  we  see  that  G  declines  and  b  rises  over  time.  This  raises  worker
productivity,  and  thus  per  capita  growth.  From  equations  (15)  and  (16)
we  see  that  long-run  steady-state  value  of  A increases  with  the  rate  of
growth  of b  and  the  rate  of  decline  in  G.  It  is  important  to  note  thatthis  mechanism  for  specialization  is  internal and  stems  from  the
workers'  optimal  choice  in  response  to worker-firm  wage  bargaining
mechanism.  This  differs  from  analyses  in  which  specialization  occurs
externally in  the  process of  production  (as  the  market  expands),
because  of  productivity  gains  that  accrue  via  learning-by-doing  and
increasing  returns  [as  in  Yang  and  Borland  (1991)].
Finally,  with  respect  to  human  capital  scale effects  (Romer,
1990),  versus rate or  intensity of  accumulation  effects  (Lucas,  1988),
our  model  suggests  that  the  Romerian  scale  effects  are  only
transitional, vanishing  over  the  long  run  (t-x),  while  the  Lucas-like
rate effects  remain  important  even  in  the  long-run.
Thus,  in terms  of  the  "convergence  vs.  divergence"  debate  (e.g.
Baumol  (1986),  De  Long(1988)),  economies  with  similar  population  growth
rates  ,  tastes  and  educational  technologies,  but  different initial
human  capital,  will  experience  same growth  rates  in  the  very  long  run,
but  different  growth  rates  in  the  short  or  intermediate  run;  growth
rates  differ,  even  in  the  long  run,  for  different  parameters  values.
III.  Social  Optimum
As  was  noted  in  Kim  (1989),  the  contemporaneous  economy  in which
(b(t),  G(t))  are  fixed  is  socially  optimal.  The  question  now  is
whether  the  dynamic  path  of  the  competitive  equilibrium  is  socially
optimal,  once  the  impact  of  b  and  G  on  H  is  considered.  Endogenizing  H
from  equation  (5),  the  new  the  budget  constraint  becomes:
1/2
(9')  c  =  b  - (M/GN)  - g(b,G)
10Note  the  smaller  incremental  contribution  of  G,  here,  compared  to
competitive  economy  (equation  9),  as  increasing  G  is  now  associated
with  increasing  H.  Following  the  earlier  steps,  equations  (14)  and
(15)  will  stay  the  same,  but  equation  (16)  will  be  modified  by  a
multiplicative  factor  of  1/2  in  the  first  term.  However,  since  the
long-run  steady-state  component  of  (16)  remains  unchanged,  equations
(14)  and  (17)  must  stay  the  same.  Thus,  in  this  world,  the  central
planner  cannot affect  the  long-run steady  state  growth  of  the  economy,
although  it  may  affect  the  transitional  dynamics  of  the  economy.
IV.  Conclusion
With  no  external  spillover  effects  of  specialization,  the
competitive  growth  path  is  also  socially  optimal  in  the  long-run.
Existence  of  such  effects  (e.g.,  via  an  aggregate  effect  of  intensive
human  capital  on  output,  or  via  learning-by-doing,  where  perhaps  the
cost  of  acquiring  new  b,  g(b),  falls  in  b),  may  cause  socially  optimal
paths  to  differ  from  the  decentralized  path.  We  have  not  addressed
these  issues.  In  any  case,  we  believe  more  work  needs  to  be  devoted  to
understand  the  link  between  specialization,  human  capital  and  growth.
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